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INTRODUCTION 
Biographical and autoethnographic accounts can tell us much about our relations with 
other beings, and are useful for studying the ways we articulate how we come to know 
and care for nonhuman animals. These accounts often capture the embodied nature of 
people’s experiences in encountering others, and can be explored for ways of 
understanding the role played by the body and its affects in advocating for change in our 
relationships with nonhuman animal species.  
This attention given to the body is part of a growing corpus that privileges 
embodiment in research. As Despret (2013) puts it, ‘bodies are actively being involved’ 
in research in ever more foregrounded ways. Much of this focus has originated from the 
social sciences with a growing awareness that our bodies are the source of how society is 
structured. For Shilling (2012): ‘It is the properties and capacities of embodied humans 
that provide the corporeal basis on which identities and social relations are consolidated 
and changed.’ It is never only our ‘disembodied’ intellectual evaluations that guide 
action, but always thoughts entangled with bodily reactions that become knowable and 
nameable as emotions: joy, disgust, anger, fear, etc. 
Although its roots have not always been engaged with species relations — indeed, 
the history of sociology and philosophy have left us with the feeling that other bodies are 
barely relevant to the creation of social life — such study has brought the nonhuman and 
inanimate into the field of affecting and affected bodies with which we are entangled. 
The dominant (male, white) view of social life focusing on abstract, Universalist 
processes while excluding particular bodies within those processes is being challenged. 
The beings who make our social world work are not only human. To pay these other 
individuals consideration is to give what Walker (1992) has called an ‘attention to the 
particular’ grounded in the feminist ethic-of-care tradition that rejects hierarchical 
Cartesian objectivism. Such a rationalist ethic is at the heart of speciesism, the 
ideological practice — ideologies are always dynamic practices — that arbitrarily 
separates our species from others. 
This turn to the body and embodiment has brought about a redefinition of what the 
body is. Blackman (2012) writes that bodies are best defined as ‘processes that extend 
into and are immersed in worlds. That is, rather than talk of bodies, we might instead talk 
of brain–body–world entanglements, and where, how and whether we should attempt to 
draw boundaries between the human and nonhuman, self and other.’ She suggests that if 
we understand our experiences as ‘brain–body–world entanglements’ we come much 
closer to sensory reality and our corporeal embeddedness in relations. As with other areas 
of lived practice, scholarship also only begin to make sense when we take account of our 
‘brain–body–world entanglements’ with the subjects of our curiosity and criticality. 
When this is applied (or rather, ‘felt into’) the ways in which the lives of nonhuman 
animals can be made more visible, the work finds itself at home in the field of Critical 
Animal Studies (CAS). For Taylor and Twine (2014) CAS ‘is concerned with the nexus 
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of activism, academia and animal suffering and maltreatment.’ CAS scholars do not stand 
outside of their study; rather, the task is to engage and attempt to change the conditions or 
circumstances in which nonhuman animals are currently exploited.  
Autoethnographic and autobiographical reflexivity are essential to the field’s 
pursuit of moving the lives of nonhuman animals to the centre of scholarship and social 
debate. Autoethnography, according to Ellis (2004) is an attempt to produce work that 
seeks to describe personal experience in order to understand cultural experience. Such an 
approach aims to produce aesthetic and evocative writing (or audio-visual recordings) 
that is made possible by being part of a culture, by inhabiting and exploring particular 
cultural identities. For the autoethnographer, combining autobiography and ethnography, 
the genre is, as Ellis suggests, an invitation to write in a way that moves back and forth 
between personal introspection and academic reflection, methods that are simultaneously 
social and psychological. 
In using autoethnography to pay attention to nonhumans, ‘this reflexive approach, 
that is central to writing for animals, brings the lives of the writers of CAS to centre-stage 
(for example in disclosures about personal veganism, animal advocacy and activism) and 
in this way CAS writers are not indistinct figures; rather, through autobiographical 
disclosures, they move from the margins to the centre of their work’ (Peggs 2014). 
In this research I have utilized the narrative methods of autoethnography, referring 
to texts in the form of stories and vignettes that incorporate my experiences into the 
ethnographic descriptions of others. My narrative intersects with the analysis of patterns 
and processes in animal rights activism, drawing on my own writing about those 
experiences to reflect upon and make experiential sense of the detail of how emerging 
forms of nonhuman advocacy are bound up with concepts of embodiment and cultural 
practices. In particular, I give special attention to advocacy work done by the Save 
Movement, an open collective of animal activists based in various cities across (mainly) 
Western democracies, who have prioritized emotional and empathetic bodily encounter 
with the nonhuman farmed animal. My curiosity was drawn to these activists because of 
their desire to come closer to the bodies of those nonhuman others — that is, to the living 
bodies, before they are turned into food, clothing and supplementary products for human 
(and companion animal) use. My ongoing engagement with the Save Movement (in 
Canada and the UK) is not only a means to study activist practice, but, as Taylor and 
Twine (2014) exhort, a process of enmeshment to aid scholarly clarity: 
‘professionalisation should not presume a detachment from the rich diversity of civil 
society and protest. Critical researchers then can (and in fact, must) study such social 
movements, advise them and critically analyze those obdurate social institutions and 
practices that serve to curtail progressive social change.’ Such practice ensures that 
theory remains ‘relevant to understanding and changing the material conditions of 
animals, and to historicizing the still normative concepts that have been largely 
successful in shielding human–animal relations from critical scrutiny.’ 
This article is an exploration of the practices of the Save Movement; specifically 
time I spent with Toronto Pig Save. I hope to articulate the ways in which emotions, 
empathy and activism intersect in their ongoing practice, and how the Save Movement’s 
emphasis on bodily encounter and the making visible of already existing embodied 
entanglements with farmed nonhuman animals, suggests a form of ‘active witnessing’ 
that offers opportunity for radically reimagined relationships with those species we 
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identity as food. This is not a purely cognitive process. It begins in the body with an 
emotional readiness to encounter the other, and is based on new foundations for feeling. 
 
THE SAVE MOVEMENT, EMPATHY AND ACTIVISM 
The Save Movement began in Toronto in 2010 when feminist and activist Anita Kranjc 
responded to being confronted on her daily morning walk with her dog companion by 
trucks full of pigs on their way to slaughter. Kranjc knew about the Quality Meat Packers 
slaughterhouse near where she lived in downtown Toronto. But coming close to the pigs 
every day forced her to take action. Shukin (2009) argues that standard farming practices 
meet only the very basic needs of animals, and these only to satisfy profit motives, and 
never the animals’ ‘wants’. Intensive processing rests upon what she calls a ‘breaking’ 
and a ‘denial of “becomings”.’ Although already vegan, Kranjc had not previously had 
such close bodily encounter with farmed animals within this ‘limbo economy of 
interminable survival’ where ‘coping is all’ (Shukin). So in December 2010, Kranjc 
founded Toronto Pig Save. The mission was to metaphorically give slaughterhouses glass 
walls by showing those outside what went on inside. Much of her community organizing 
is driven by a desire for social justice and equality through a ‘love-based’ approach 
inspired by Tolstoy and Gandhi. Kranjc and fellow activists collected donated art, 
photographs, and illustrations that depicted the slaughter of pigs. In July 2011 they began 
weekly vigils outside the slaughterhouse. The vigils comprised of two main actions: First, 
they printed leaflets and placards and stood where the trucks passed and stopped at red 
lights long enough for the activists to give the pigs water, watermelon, and take 
photographs. Second, they began to speak to the drivers of the cars idling at those red 
lights to spread knowledge and information about the characteristics of nonhuman 
animals and their perceived wrongful slaughter.  
The growth of the Save Movement and the means by which it sets out to achieve its 
aims is an exciting development for those sympathetic toward or striving for animal 
liberation; and simultaneously a rich area for study. Of course advocacy on behalf of 
nonhuman animals is not new, and has organized precedents going back at least two 
hundred years, especially to reduce the suffering of animals from vivisection and the 
worst abuses of meat production (Kean 2000). However, the industrialization and 
massification of farmed animal production, the worst abuses of which were first brought 
to the public’s attention by Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines in 1964, and Brigid 
Brophy’s Sunday Times article in 1965 (in the UK at least), laid the ground for a range of 
organizations to emerge and reshape the social movement for improvements in animal 
welfare beyond conservation, and, with the publication of work by authors such as Carol 
J. Adams, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, move toward claims for animal rights. As 
McAllister Groves (2001) noted in his study of an American animal rights organization, 
‘the people that the activists most respect rarely talk about pets. They talk about 
philosophy. The philosophers are the high priests of the animal rights movement. They 
write books. They teach at universities.’  
  The Save Movement is a new and exciting progression in the field of animal rights 
activism for a number of reasons, and in its differentiation from other established and 
emerging practices focused on either animal protection, advocacy or liberation, makes a 
claim on researchers to understand its motivations, practices, effects and affects. Despite 
the name, Save activists do not primarily focus on ‘saving’ or directly rescuing the 
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incomprehensible number of animals sent to slaughter each day (although at many vigils 
a tiny number of animals have been kept from their deaths). The core practices of Save 
Movement vigils are: 1) collective witnessing of the process of animal slaughter; 2) 
providing momentary solace and succour, including with water and fruit, to the animals; 
3) making visible the spaces where killing takes place and the structural means by which 
consumer cultures aid and abet that killing (through for example the placing of traffic 
lights and management to aid the efficient passage of animal-laden trucks); and, 4) to 
share audio and visual recordings from the vigils via social media to broader audiences. 
For example, I was drawn to the videos and images shared by the activists on social 
media and went to take part in the vigils; these videos also played a large part in my 
transition from a vegetarian to a vegan diet.  These vigil practices offer up many points of 
contact for study.  
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2016) have argued that farmed animal sanctuaries, a 
“rapidly expanding” aspect of the animal rights movement, launched by the establishment 
of Farm Sanctuary in Watkins Glen, New York, in 1986, occupy a central role in 
nonhuman advocacy. These sanctuaries, now worldwide, are places in which individual 
previously farmed animals come, after escape or rescue, to live out the rest of their lives 
free from harm or exploitation, with considerable time and money spent on their 
wellbeing and care. They are also education and advocacy centers, and known for their 
zoocentric policies such as there being no meat, leather or wool allowed on the premises. 
The forms of activism and advocacy provided in these spaces are often transformational 
for those working there and for visitors, in coming to know the individual characteristics 
and personalities of previously farmed animals.  
However, the embodied relations in these spaces are vitally different from those 
experienced between human and nonhuman outside the gates of slaughterhouses, where, 
for perhaps only a few moments, the activists present are able to collectively witness the 
passage toward death of the animals, while coming close to the physical and still 
outstandingly vulnerable bodies (Pick 2011) of the pigs, sheep, cows and chickens. This 
‘ordinary—yet extraordinary—encounter’ with the soon-to-be-dead animals ‘discloses 
the presence of a crisis’ in our understanding of our own, as well as the nonhuman’s, 
essential materiality as bodies, which is thankfully absent in the sanctuary setting. What 
the Save Movement vigils then offer is a unique example of what Pick calls ‘a creaturely 
ethics [whose] source lies in the recognition of the materiality and vulnerability of all 
living bodies, whether human or not, and in the absolute primacy of obligations over 
rights. A creaturely ethics, which recognizes in animals an exemplary case of worldly 
suffering, does not ask, What are the limits of rights? but, What are the limits of 
attention?’ My proposal of the Save Movement vigils as a unique site of ‘creaturely 
ethics’ demands our attention, as the (extra)ordinary encounters between human and 
animal become made visible both in situ and across social media. 
What follows are extracts from writings recalling the experiences and emotions of 
attending the vigils. They are, I hope, a form of what Gergen (1999) calls ‘poetic 
activism’ based on the appreciation of ‘the power of language to make new and different 
things possible and important — an appreciation which becomes possible only when 
one’s aim becomes an expanding repertoire of alternative descriptions.’ 
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AT THE VIGIL 
We count fourteen trucks this morning. Anita keeps a record of every vigil 
in her notebook. There are two hundred pigs in each truck. Those bearing 
witness know that Fearman’s Pork Inc. slaughters up to ten thousand pigs a 
day. Fearman’s! You couldn’t make it up. 
A woman with blonde hair and sunglasses drives the first truck we 
see. Anita and another activist, Hannah, have seen her before. Sometimes 
she stops at the entrance so volunteers can hurry to the sides of the truck 
and through the air holes give the pigs watermelon or water or a pat on the 
snout. An apology. Anita and Hannah discuss whether the driver might be 
sympathetic, since her behavior contrasts with that of the drivers of the 
other trucks: men wearing black T-shirts, beards, and caps, who wheel 
around the corners without slowing. The activists take a risk of being hit by 
the edges of these vast metal containers to get their photos and their last 
touches of the pigs who in only a few minutes will be slaughtered. 
It is part and parcel of the contemporary rhetoric of industrial animal 
agriculture that the language of efficiency and productivity is striated with 
that of welfare and sustainability. In recent comparisons of pigraising, 
indoor production has been touted as the most beneficial and practical, 
assuming ‘both indoor and outdoor systems are well designed and operated’ 
(McGlone 2013). Animal scientist John J. McGlone claims that we have 
only two choices ‘as we develop more sustainable systems; either change 
the systems we have or build new systems’. For McGlone, gassing ten 
thousand pigs a day is a positive step in the sustainability of pork 
production, because not only must we eat pigs but, we also must find ways 
to kill more of them. The option of not doing either is inadmissible for this 
man funded by the U.S. National Pork Board. 
It’s true that a swift death would be a mercy for these pigs, who have 
most likely spent the entirety of their short lives — around six months to 
‘finishing’ weight — without breathing fresh air, before they are crammed 
onto the trucks. During the journey many will collapse on the floor of the 
trucks, dead or dying. At the height of summer, Save members have seen 
the pigs frothing at the mouth because of the heat; in winter their bodies 
may be frozen to the metal sides of the trucks. Whatever the season, their 
bodies are often bruised and bitten, scratched and covered in feces. These 
pigs don’t have the option of an open-topped truck to leap from, like some 
others in less developed parts of the world. 
Standing alongside the volunteers as the trucks roll up, I can see that 
there are as many different emotions in the pigs’ eyes as there are eyes 
looking at us. Some are numb or blank or without hope. Some seem to 
dissociate themselves from the conditions. Unbelievably, some still appear 
hopeful and inquisitive and forgiving, as the animals shuffle over, take our 
water and watermelon, and sniff our fingers with the snouts they poke 
through the air vents. I like to think they welcome us for our witnessing. We 
literally touch the pigs, too. Seeing them in the trucks, tickling their snouts, 
not knowing, as a novice, if they would try to bite me or not, I feel their fear 
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and the curiosity. They are advocates all, calling us to their aid, and they 
suffer our hearts. That is: witnessing is painful, but the pigs suffer us in the 
other sense of the word — they bear us; seeing them makes it possible for 
us to continue with our advocacy, to make it bearable. 
 
THE FEELING BODY IN ANIMAL ACTIVISM 
Embodiment as entangled process leads to many kinds of behavior, what Probyn (2014) 
calls ‘bodily orientations, ingrained ways of embodying the world, which, while they 
may change, are truly our history forged in the flesh, taste, and memory.’ Viewing 
experience as entanglement opens us to the reality of individual others affecting us. The 
activists on the vigil, including myself, were moved emotionally, and moved to action. 
This movement came about, perhaps because of the inability of the pigs to have any 
control over their own bodies. This fact is one of the most pressing and affective at the 
vigils. The pigs, often covered in bites and wounds because of the tightly packed 
conditions, have no control over their own bodies in these traumatic spaces.  
This relationship between movement and emotion has been recognized as critically 
important in providing thicker analyses of how social movements, which include animal 
rights movements, operate within broader cultural contexts. Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 
(2001) and Gould (2003) have led the charge for a greater attention given to the study of 
emotions in social movements; not merely as strategic tools to be utilized in movement 
goals, but as messily felt experiences that shape and are shaped by lived activist practice 
outside of a political opportunities framework. As Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta have 
argued: ‘Shifts in “emotion cultures” can create new motivations for, and targets of, 
protest.’ These emotion cultures are the ways in which expectations form around cultural 
experiences, including what it might mean to protest outside slaughterhouses against the 
killing of farmed animals; as such, the emotional threads of any narrative from such 
activist practice are important to gather together for a full and rich understanding of 
meaning. For Polletta and Amenta (2001), ‘the conditions under which people protests… 
are likely to be cultural as much as structural, to include distinctive ways of seeing the 
world as much as formal rules and resources. […] They include also beliefs about who is 
likely to experience what kinds of emotions, how emotions affect behaviour, how 
emotions are repressed or expressed or transformed, beliefs about the dynamics of 
emotional “contagion”, about the effects of emotional “repression” or “denial,” about the 
relationship between affect and biology, etc.’ 
There has been little attention paid to this full range of conditions present within 
animal rights movement protests. As Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta make clear, the ways 
in which ‘the emotions displayed in protest reshape broader emotional cultures as well as 
the emotional repertoires available to later movements’ has meant that ‘animal rights 
activists’ struggles to be taken seriously as political challengers reflect a still dominant 
view of animal rights activists as unintimidating “animal lovers”,’ illustrating that 
‘protestors’ political impact may be limited by the emotional attachments attributed to 
them.’ McAllister Groves (2001) has explored the emotional content of animal rights 
movements, but found that while ‘the animal rights movement is not just a movement 
about cruelty to animals. It is a debate about the place of emotions in public life’, in his 
admittedly limited study, ‘those who derisively criticize individuals, protests, and 
strategies for being emotional in the animal rights movement are usually those who feel 
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the most vulnerable about being discredited outside the movement for the same reason.’ 
However, new work emerging from the fields of CAS and of Critical Animal 
Geographies, such as the autoethnographic accounts of dairy farming and animal auctions 
by Gillespie and Collard (2015) are opening up expressive means to engage in embodied 
ways with the lived experiences of nonhuman others, as well as the bodily entanglements 
between them and their advocates or researchers (who are sometimes both). 
What close bodily encounter with industrially farmed animals provides, which 
other forms of activist encounter do not, is this understanding of the lived materiality of 
their bodies. If we see our bodies on a continuum with other species and entangled, we 
should find it harder to exploit them. That is, as Cudworth (2011) has suggested, other 
species are ‘a formation of social power’ that alters worldviews from the abstract and 
impersonal to the particular and personal, from private to public. Such a shift is at the 
heart of the Save Movement’s strategy. Their hypothesis is that the most effective 
advocacy places our own affective bodies into the encounter. As Latimer (2013) puts it, 
‘we body forth our relations and substantiate our identities’ when we actively place our 
bodies in ‘brain–body–world entanglements’ with others. Behavioral change, then — in 
how we as a species relate to other species — comes not through ‘coming to know’ the 
other but through what Probyn has called a ‘coming to care’. This is an important concept 
for animal advocacy, a return to embodied compassionate care that, says Joy (2010), ‘the 
dominant, meat eating culture breeds out of us as we become ‘mature’ adults’. 
When we ‘come to care’ which is also coming to a specific place, such as outside a 
slaughterhouse or to a famed animal sanctuary, to explicitly show care, it changes our 
capacities for action, a fact clearly relevant for those working in animal advocacy. As 
Shilling says: 
 
Social change does not happen automatically, and nor does it occur simply as a 
result of purely intellectually motivated actions. Instead, people’s experiences of, 
and responses to, social structures are shaped significantly by their sensory and 
sensual selves. These variables are important as they can exert an important impact 
on whether people feel at ease with, and tend to reproduce the ‘structures’, ‘rules’, 
‘resources’ or ‘social fields’ they are most familiar with, or emotionally experience 
these structures as unpleasant, undesirable and worthy of transformation. 
 
Probyn has asked: ‘What forms of care are most effective for changing our behavior? 
How do we come to care? And which types of care have the desired effects?’ Lack of 
attention to bodily entanglements with others has given us a social world built upon the 
exploitation of other species. Taking part in the vigils outside the slaughterhouses could 
be read as an attempt to engage with this ‘coming to care’ through embodied knowledge 
borne of close encounter.  
A simple term for this might be empathy, an emotion that Gruen (2015) thinks of as 
‘a particular type of attention … a kind of moral perception’. For Gruen empathy is ‘the 
ability to blend emotion and cognition to understand the situation of the other.’ However, 
for Despret and Porcher (2007) empathy is too narrow a term: ‘Empathy allows us to talk 
about what it is to be (like) the other, but does not raise the question “what is it to be 
‘with’ the other”.’ Acampora (2006) also veers away from both empathy and sympathy, 
suggesting they are ‘more airy, psychic’ notions that do not provide a satisfactory sense 
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of dense physical experience. What Acampora wishes to avoid is to employ empathy as 
‘an ontology that grants the presence already of subject/object division and 
subject/subject separation.’ Instead, Acampora suggests ‘it is time, as it were, to put the 
body back into moral sense’ and his attempt to do so is to work with the concept of 
‘symphysis’ as an ‘experiential principle of conviviality’ between bodies, and which 
places much more emphasis on the corporal component of how we sense and make sense 
of others. Symphysis is much more useful and responsible a concept than empathy, in 
Acampora’s argument, for exploring interspecies compassion and how we encounter and 
form relations at the somatic level: through bodily engagement.  
Both Despret and Acampora offer useful reappraisals of the concept of empathy. 
However, the activists employ the concepts of empathy and compassion as reasonably 
understood. The activist Hannah runs the ‘Sympathy at Slaughter’ Instagram account. 
Hannah and Anita discuss the empathy of the female driver. Between us, we offer each 
other empathy for what we commonly experience. Indeed, Despret (2013) continues to 
employ empathy too: ‘I choose to keep it, but only as a tool, in order to give it other 
meanings, to complicate the situations where this word may be evoked. Empathy 
becomes multiple, as are bodies, as are encounters, as are animals who are the living 
actors of these encounters. Embodied empathy […] shifts its meanings from one situation 
to the other. And it gains different meanings, and different outcomes, according to 
different stakes of the practices.’ 
For the Save Movement activists, empathy is a real, felt and embodied experience, 
a ‘thinking through the body’ as Blackman calls it, essential for reimagining the 
frameworks that organize our experiences, such as the relationships between the 
individual/social, structure/agency, mind/body. Only then is what we might be as a 
species be a ‘becoming-with the nonhuman’ (Wright 2014) and a true reflection of our 
existing material relations. 
 
BACK ON THE VIGIL 
We leave them as the trucks pull away as the lights change. We walk away as 
their advocates. We call others to their aid — the people who pass by in 
pickups and cars: some ignore us; others ‘honk for humanity’ and wave; 
some take our leaflets and literature; others roll up their windows as we get 
close and turn up their radios so they cannot hear us ask them to think of the 
pigs. 
After the first truck leaves, I look at the photographs I’ve taken through 
the holes in the side of the truck. One pig’s eye has a ring of blood around the 
black pupil. The eye does not, however, look at me. Instead, it focuses to his 
left, as if the eye is unable to bear me bearing witness to his suffering. I 
detect a sad bewilderment in the eye of the pig, almost shame in his 
powerlessness, a wish that his creaturely exposure be taken away — as if he 
has done something wrong; as if the shame is his and not mine. I imagine 
that, if it could, his spirit would levitate out of this hog truck, detach from the 
fate that is destined for their bodies. 
When the truck has gone and with it the pigs, three of us remain on the 
small island in the middle of the street. I don’t quite cry. What kind of tears 
would I shed? Grief at what I see? Frustration at my powerlessness? Relief at 
 9 
doing something, at least? A mixture of all three? I don’t quite know what to 
do. I want to imagine my way into the mind of that pig who would not look 
me in the eye, yet worry that if I do I’ll break down. Hannah is tearful. She 
tells me how much she admires Anita’s work in establishing the Save 
Movement. Hannah is fearless in approaching people and handing over 
literature, even when they want to disengage. Compassion is her driving 
motive — for the pigs and the people in their cars. For Hannah, as for Anita 
and others, bearing witness to the endless slaughter of nonhuman animals is 
their calling. Christine, a teacher at a school down the road, runs over to get 
more leaflets to hand out to the drivers. I stand between the two of them not 
knowing how to think. I’m not quite ready to leaflet. Like many new 
activists, I am anxious about confronting others with my beliefs, especially 
those who may not feel the same way. Because I don’t know what to think 
about what I’m seeing, I can’t draw myself into conversation with passersby. 
I can’t, if I’m telling the truth, look them in the eye. I know, deep down, that 
I’m ashamed: of these drivers seeing me; of not yet fully bearing witness; of 
not yet letting go of the need and desire to be part of the ‘normal,’ meat-
eating, animal-exploiting world; of needing to be like everyone else and liked 
by them. I have not yet the bravery or reassurances that everything will be 
okay, to fully let that identity go. 
Yet here I am, bearing witness.  
And being witnessed is a little more bearable than before. 
 
BEARING WITNESS: WITNESSING AS FEELING THE UNSPEAKABLE 
Witnessing is a strange act, what Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (1992) have called a 
‘nonhabitual, estranged conceptual prism’ through which we apprehend and make 
available to the imagination of others the events that are seen. Felman and Laub’s work 
arises out of the witnessing and testimony of Holocaust survivors, where the task of 
witnessing is to account for ‘the scale of what has happened in contemporary history’. To 
bear witness is to apprehend, whether one wishes to or not (consider the bystander 
witness), the truth of what is happening during an event. It is to open one’s eyes to what 
is taking place, but not only one’s eyes. My initiation into the world of nonhuman animal 
suffering was made through bearing witness (first, online) to scenes of animals being put 
through the processes of exploitation and slaughter. Now at the vigils I was bearing 
witness, and bearing witness to others bearing witness too. 
What is the value of bearing witness? Nussbaum (2013) puts forward the idea that 
‘good societies’ should cultivate in their citizens particular emotions, such as 
compassion; this provides for stable and motivated societies. One of the main ways to 
foster compassion in society, argues Nussbaum, is through the concept of ‘tragic 
spectatorship.’ She states this was a beneficial aspect of ancient society, especially in 
Greece, where the spectatorship of ‘tragic’ Greek theatre ‘dramatized the psychological 
and bodily suffering and tragic choices’ faced by its citizens, and, says McQueen (2014), 
‘thereby [allows] the spectator to imaginatively enter into the world of others’ and 
consider those difficult choices for himself (caveat: the audience would have been almost 
exclusively male). Such tragic spectatorship, argues Nussbaum, contains powerful 
narrative content that educates the body emotionally as well as the mind politically. 
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McQueen is critical of Nussbaum’s argument. She suggests that Nussbaum does 
not make the case strongly enough — that Nussbaum ‘avoids the more difficult task of 
demonstrating that “tragedy undermines exclusion”’ and, as McQueen goes on to say, 
‘this argument about the political effects of tragedy is, at best, suggestive’. 
Yet, I would argue, both Nussbaum and McQueen miss the point of what is 
valuable and effective in the idea of ‘tragic spectatorship.’ Both concentrate on the 
content of the tragic plays rather than on the active aspect — a phenomenological process 
of witnessing. That is, it is not only tragedy that brings us close to compassion for the 
other; it is the act of witnessing that tragedy in person and with others. If a tragedy 
educates its witness to the ‘psychological and bodily suffering’ undergone by those actors 
in the tragedy, then its value is in the witness empathizing — feeling — those bodily 
traumas suffered. The witnessing is a performance in and of the body. This becomes a 
useful concept for thinking about the process of bearing witness at the slaughterhouse 
vigil. In this sense, bearing witness to the suffering of the animals whom we see for just a 
moment in the transport trucks on their way to slaughter are acts of ‘tragic spectatorship.’  
But do they educate us in forms of political emotions, such as compassion? And 
does this education allow ‘the spectator to imaginatively enter into the world of others’ 
and act accordingly? Bearing witness is not only about ‘cultivating integration’ between 
one’s values and one’s acts, as Joy (2011) expresses it. Bearing witness is about being 
present at conflicts where the truth of a situation requires people to be present, to hold 
power to account. Booth (2006) writes that those bearing witness become living 
reminders of a past and serve as sentinels, urging others to remember, too. To bear 
witness, says Blustein (2008), is to assert the moral status of victims and their equal 
membership in a moral community, exercised by giving them a voice. Bearing witness to 
the suffering of the pigs on the way to slaughter exposes the existing entanglements 
between humans and nonhumans: they are there because we desire their bodies as flesh. 
As an act of witnessing, attending these vigils reveals our means of perception and, 
importantly, the way we think about how we perceive others. To consider the animal 
him- or herself as a participant in the witnessing — as seeing me, or being too ashamed to 
be seen — is a powerful means of shifting those boundaries. How we perceive others 
shapes what we think and feel about them, as individuals and as groups. Perception is 
generally thought of as a process of thought. And yet the cognitive sciences, argue Lakoff 
and Johnson (1999) ‘tell us that human reason is a form of animal reason, a reason 
inextricably tied to our bodies and the peculiarities of our brains’. Bearing witness is in 
this sense a physical process of perceiving with moral attention. As Joy puts it: ‘Virtually 
every atrocity in the history of humankind was enabled by a populace that turned away 
from a reality that seemed too painful to face, while virtually every revolution for peace 
and justice has been made possible by a group of people who chose to bear witness and 
demanded that others bear witness as well.’ Active witnessing moves the body (notably, 
the face) toward an emotional experience of empathy or compassion. Its opposite is 
disconnection. When we look away we disconnect from the suffering of others. We do 
this in the physical act of not looking.  
The Save Movement and other groups make witnessing not only essential to the 
remembering (itself an embodied expression of re-membering) of tragedy but removes 
the blinkers from our view of the world. Witnessing can stimulate solidarity and the 
strength gained by acting together in a common cause. Yet it can also untap a wellspring 
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that can flood our bodies with grief at the unspeakable. What’s so striking about these 
vigils is how, at their most impactful, they allow bodily knowledge to shimmer with 
affect, to make abundantly clear that brain–body–world entanglements exist across 
species boundaries. Remaining open enough to such a burden — the bearing of witness 
— can be laborious. However, as Jenni (2011) writes: ‘How to bear witness is a matter of 
moral judgment that those who would honor the animal dead must take on. That struggle 
for wise judgment is itself a labor of respect.’ 
Joy agrees: ‘[C]ollective witnessing closes the gap in social consciousness.’ 
Collective witnessing is perhaps about being seen to be witnessing — seen by the 
animals, by the passersby, and by other activists who support and validate the witnessing. 
For Collins (2001) such collective witnessing would be an example of Durkheim’s 
‘conscience collective’ with, according to Collins, three ‘high ritual density ingredients’: 
 
(1) the physical assembly of people, so there is bodily awareness and 
copresence. (2) A shared focus of attention. (3) The focus of attention becomes 
a mutual focus of attention. Each participant becomes aware of each other’s 
awareness, and this each one’s unity at this moment with each other. This is the 
crucial process, the shared sense of the group focusing together, that creates 
what Durkheim called ‘conscience collective,’ fusing cognitive and moral 
unity.  
 
The collective power of becoming aware of others’ awareness in copresence of the 
vulnerable animal bodies gives the Save Movement its affective impact — many 
attendees report being profoundly moved by these moments. Derrida (2008) has brought 
forth a similar idea of not only seeing or of being seen, but being ‘seen seen’. This 
concept is central to how close bodily encounters at the slaughterhouse vigils are 
impactful for both the activists taking place and for the wider goals of achieving animal 
liberation. For Derrida, to be seen by the other, and also to accept that we are ‘seen seen’ 
— that the nonhuman animal knows that we know we have been seen by her — is at the 
heart of how a change in perspective about animals might come about. The Kantian, 
rationalist view of other animals is based on the denial of ‘being seen’ by them; that they 
do not have the faculties to recognize the meaning in our looking at them. Our dominant 
ethical relations to nonhumans are based on this ability to see them but ‘without being 
seen seen naked by someone who, from deep within a life called animal, and not only by 
means of a gaze, would have obliged them to recognize, at the moment of address, that 
this was their affair, their lookout.’ That is, for Derrida, most philosophy before Peter 
Singer’s Animal Liberation denied the animal agency and perspective — a view of a 
world other than a human one. For Derrida, these images of suffering animals seen only 
from a human perspective, as if behind smoked glass, are pathetic. But these ‘pathetic’ 
scenes ‘open the immense question of pathos and the pathological, precisely, that is, of 
suffering, pity, and compassion’. 
It is right to ask of myself and of the other activists present if we have done more 
for the animal than the philosophers whom Derrida attacks. Those who have ‘no doubt 
seen, observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal’ but who ‘neither wanted nor had the 
capacity to draw any systematic consequences from the fact that an animal, could, facing 
them, look at them, clothed or naked, and in a word, without a word, address them.’ 
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These philosophers, says Derrida, ‘have never been seen seen by the animal’. Are the 
emotions we feel — the shame, the sadness, the anger — of benefit in making changes to 
the material relations with farmed animal species? Do we save them, after all? I argue 
that through bearing witness at these vigils I, and the other activists, have come to an 
embodied knowledge of our brain–body–world entanglements in which the animal is 
already present. That is, the material relations between Western forms of consumption 
and the slaughtered animal body are already present but hidden; and that this activism — 
in the moment, and then remediated and distributed through the connections of social 
media — traces lines between those entanglements and makes them (at least a little more) 
visible. These lines are formed of embodied emotional connection. As I was bearing 
witness to another’s experience of life, I understood that we were activists who bore 
witness but who were also being ‘seen seen.’ Active witnessing is not done from behind a 
screen. Active witnessing, especially in a social collective setting, offers a sense of being 
present and conscious to what is happening before us. Witnessing is not merely a 
cognitive or perceptual act. It is a felt experience, a somatic, corporeal entraining. It is, or 
at least can be, a ‘tragic spectatorship’ centered on feelings of empathy. Empathy, in turn, 
is the way our brains fire so that we believe and feel what the other is experiencing. 
When we witness the pig’s shame, fear, and bewilderment, we can experience these, too, 
with the right moral attention. Active witnessing of the actual animal bodies, whether in 
motion or immobile, is central to the sense of empowerment that activists from the Save 
Movement say they experience. That is, seeing the pigs in their powerlessness would 
make us feel powerless, save for our ability to move our own bodies. Such activism is 
about movement and mobilization. Both these elements in countering trauma are central 
to active witnessing. 
 
CONCLUSION 
To exclude the sensing body from advocacy work reduces its effectiveness. As Buller 
(2013) quoting Springgay (2011), puts it: ‘[F]arm animals offer us the potential or the 
promise of an affective mattering derived from ‘a more proximal, contingent and bodily 
form of thought’’ and this is made up of what is mostly lacking from images: ‘noises, 
smells, movement and shared vitality.’ Changing our relation to other species comes 
through being in company with them, body to body. This is especially true of those 
nonhuman bodies whom we disappear into the food system. This ‘thinking through the 
body’ is critical for changing our species’ relation to others. 
The shame of the pig who would not look me in the eye has stayed with me. I’m 
not going to baulk at using such formulations, because an empathic anthropomorphism 
can help us change our relationship to other species, as Daston and Mitman (2006) argue. 
This anthropomorphism isn’t the one criticized by ‘objective’ scientists, but rather an 
understanding that our forms of thinking are on a continuum with nonhuman forms of 
thought — for instance, our terror, grief, and bewilderment are, at root, the same. My 
shame was felt as a sense of uncomfortable identification — of being seen in direct 
encounter. And this was not only to be seen by the commuters, but by the pigs. I felt the 
power that Derrida assigns to the gaze of his cat: the look that makes us aware of ‘the 
naked truth of every gaze, when that truth allows me to see and be seen through the eyes 
of the other, in the seeing and not just seen eyes of the other’ [emphasis in original]. It is 
through the other that we identify ourselves. To act differently from the rest of society — 
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as part of a slaughterhouse vigil, for example — is an act of counter-identification. It 
begins, as Pick puts it, a reversal of ‘the untold labor that goes into the sustaining and 
upkeep of identity.’ 
Losing sight of the bodies of those animals with whom we are in ‘brain–body–
world entanglements’ is a willful blindness that Derrida accuses us of consenting to in 
our refusal to be ‘seen seen’ by the animal. This refusal is to be complicit with the 
structures that distance us from the nonhuman. The Save slaughterhouse vigils allow us 
to re/spect the nonhuman: to look again, more closely. Such acts are able to make the 
lives of animals more visible, brought back into the public domain. The very specific 
embodied nature of such activist encounter is central to the ways in which the emotions 
felt — empathy, shame, fear — can, through allowing us to be ‘seen seen’, help us 
rethink and re-perspectivize the boundary between human and nonhuman. 
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